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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1443 
 ___________ 
 
 YULIUS LANGI, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                             Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A096-266-979) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 2, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 9, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Yulius Langi petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying asylum, 
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withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  We 
will deny the petition for review.  
 Langi is a citizen of Indonesia, who arrived in the United States in September 
2001 on a B-2 visa to compete in a whitewater-rafting competition on behalf of the 
Indonesian national team.  He was entitled to stay until October 20, 2001, but stayed 
beyond that period without authorization.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
charged Langi with removability under section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), and Langi applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT relief.   
 At his administrative hearing in 2007, Langi testified that he wished to remain in 
the United States because he believed that, as a practicing Christian, he would be subject 
to religious persecution in Indonesia.  He said that while living in the small town of 
Sukabumi, his house was repeatedly stoned, and that in November 1998, a mob of 
militant Muslims attacked him and broke his nose.  After the attack, Langi was jailed 
without explanation for two or three days.  Soon thereafter, he and his family moved to 
Jakarta.  In Jakarta, Langi did not suffer any personal persecution, but there were frequent 
bombings and he did not feel safe.  In 2000, he moved to Manado.  As noted, Langi came 
to the United States in September 2001.  Langi’s family remained in Jakarta, and has 
been free from harassment since the November 1998 incident.   
 The IJ concluded that Langi was removable, finding that the asylum application 
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was untimely and that Langi failed to meet his respective burdens of proof for 
withholding of removal and for CAT relief.  The BIA then dismissed Langi’s appeal.  
The BIA agreed with the IJ that Langi’s asylum application was untimely.  The BIA 
further affirmed the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal because Langi failed to 
demonstrate past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution if he returned to 
Indonesia.  The BIA concluded that while the attack on Langi was disturbing, it was not 
sufficiently serious to qualify as past persecution, and that even if it did, the presumption 
of future persecution was rebutted because Langi could avoid persecution by relocating to 
Jakarta or Manado.  The BIA also ruled that Langi had failed to establish either that he 
would be singled out for future persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of 
persecution of Christians in Indonesia.  Langi then filed this petition for review. 
 We have jurisdiction over the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant to section 
242(a).  Where, as here, the BIA has issued a decision on the merits and not simply a 
summary affirmance, we review the BIA’s decision.  See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 
271 (3d Cir. 2002).  We must uphold the BIA’s factual findings if they are “supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
will reverse a finding of fact only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”  INA § 242(b)(4)(B).   
 At the outset, we note that although Langi originally sought asylum, withholding 
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of removal, and CAT relief, we have jurisdiction over only the withholding-of-removal 
claim.  As Langi acknowledges, the BIA concluded that his asylum claim was untimely.  
Our jurisdiction over claims concerning the timeliness of an asylum application is 
limited:  we may consider only constitutional or legal issues.  See INA § 208(a)(3); 
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir. 2006).  Langi has raised no such 
issue, and accordingly, we may not upset the BIA’s order denying the claim as untimely.  
Further, while Langi sought relief under CAT before the IJ, he did not appeal the IJ’s 
denial of that claim to the BIA.  Therefore, he did not administratively exhaust that claim, 
and we lack jurisdiction to review it.  See INA § 242(d)(1); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 To obtain withholding of removal, an alien must establish that it is more likely 
than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.  See INA § 241 (b)(3)(A); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 
(3d Cir. 2003).  To make this showing, the alien must demonstrate either past persecution 
(which creates a rebuttable presumption that the alien would be persecuted upon return to 
that country) or a likelihood of future persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b).   
 Here, Langi presents only a claim that he will face future persecution.
1
  Such a 
                                                 
1
  In his statement of issues on appeal, Langi listed issues that concern both 
past persecution and future persecution.  However, Langi has presented no argument 
whatsoever in support of any past-persecution claim, and we therefore conclude that “he 
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claim requires the applicant to demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution and that that 
fear is objectively reasonable.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).  
The objective prong can be satisfied by showing either that (1) the alien “would be 
individually singled out for persecution” or (2) there is a “pattern or practice” in the 
country of persecuting individuals who are similarly situated to the alien.  Id.  Even 
assuming that Langi possesses a subjective fear of persecution, we conclude that 
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that he has failed to show that his fear 
is objectively reasonable. 
 We agree with the BIA that Langi has failed to establish that he has a reasonable, 
individualized fear of persecution.  The record shows that Langi did not suffer any 
persecution in either Jakarta or Manado while living there after being attacked in 
Sukabumi in 1998 — in fact, he was selected to represent his nation as a member of 
Indonesia’s whitewater-rafting team.  Further, as the BIA noted, “his Christian practicing 
family has not been attacked by Muslim extremists since his departure from Indonesia.”  
We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of this claim.  
See Lie, 396 F.3d at 537 (rejecting Indonesian national’s claim that he would face future 
prosecution on account of his Christianity where his family had remained in Indonesia 
without being harmed). 
 We also agree with the BIA that the evidence in the record does not show that 
                                                                                                                                                             
has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.”  Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 92 
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there is a pattern or practice of persecuting Christians in Indonesia.  Langi presented only 
scattered articles from 2000 through 2002, which provide little information about the 
likelihood that Langi would be persecuted if forced to return to Indonesia almost a decade 
later, and various State Department reports, which we have previously held do not 
support a pattern-or-practice claim.  See Wong v. Attorney General, 539 F.3d 225, 235 
(3d Cir. 2008); Lie, 396 F.3d at 537.  Langi urges us to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 192 (5th Cir. 2004), where the court held that “there 
was a pattern of persecution of Christians in Indonesia.”  Langi’s invocation of Eduard is 
unavailing:  we have recently refused to rely on Eduard because it is predicated on 
“outdated” evidence and fails to reflect Indonesia’s improved conditions.  See Wong, 539 
F.3d at 235.  Thus, while Langi has presented evidence that some anti-Christian violence 
persists in Indonesia, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 
conclusion that it does not rise to the level of a pattern or practice. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
